

CMSC 28100

Introduction to
Complexity Theory

Spring 2025

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Which **problems**
can be **solved**
through computation?

Deciding a language

- Let M be a Turing machine and let $Y \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$
- We say that M **decides** Y if
 - M accepts every $w \in Y$, and
 - M rejects every $w \in \{0, 1\}^* \setminus Y$
- This is a mathematical model of what it means to “**solve a problem**”

Invalid inputs

- **Informal problem statement:** “Given a graph G , determine whether it is connected”
- **The same problem, formulated as a language:**

CONNECTED = $\{\langle G \rangle : G \text{ is a connected graph}\}$

What if we are given $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ that is not the encoding of any graph?

A: This situation cannot occur

B: It doesn't matter what we do

C: We can accept or reject, but we must not loop

D: We must reject

Respond at [Pollevo.com/whoza](https://www.pollevo.com/whoza) or text “whoza” to 22333

oh, we should accept

graph, we should reject


Invalid inputs

- There can exist “invalid inputs” $w \in \{0, 1\}^*$ that **do not encode graphs**
 - For example, suppose we are using **adjacency matrices** to encode graphs
 - Then $|\langle G \rangle|$ is a **perfect square** for every graph G
 - Therefore, 10101 is not the encoding of any graph
- Technically, $10101 \notin \text{CONNECTED} = \{\langle G \rangle : G \text{ is a connected graph}\}$
- To **decide** CONNECTED, a Turing machine would have to **reject** 10101

Checking for validity

- **OBJECTION:** “But the **informal** problem statement didn’t say anything about rejecting invalid inputs!”
 - “Given a graph G , determine whether it is connected”
- **RESPONSE 1:** It is **not hard to check** whether a given string w is the encoding of a graph
- Therefore, if we are trying to understand how hard/easy the problem is, we **don’t need to worry** about invalid inputs

Promise problems



- **RESPONSE 2:** There are more sophisticated ways of modeling “problems”
- Definition: A **promise problem** is a pair $\Pi = (Y, N)$, where Y and N are disjoint subsets of $\{0, 1\}^*$
 - E.g., $Y = \{\langle G \rangle : G \text{ is a connected graph}\}$ and $N = \{\langle G \rangle : G \text{ is a disconnected graph}\}$
- We say that a Turing machine M **solves** Π if it accepts every $w \in Y$ and it rejects every $w \in N$

Ignoring invalid inputs

- In this course, for simplicity's sake and for historical reasons, we will focus on **languages** rather than promise problems
- However, for simplicity's sake, we will mostly **ignore** the issue of invalid inputs

Summary

- “Deciding a language” is not a **perfect** mathematical model of “solving a problem” ...
- But it is a **pretty good** model

Decidable and undecidable

- Let Y be a language
- We say that Y is **decidable** if there exists a Turing machine M that decides Y
- Otherwise, we say that Y is **undecidable**

Which problems
can be solved
through computation?

Which languages are decidable?

Examples

- PALINDROMES = $\{w \in \{0, 1\}^* : w \text{ is the same forward and backward}\}$
- PARITY = $\{w \in \{0, 1\}^* : w \text{ has an odd number of ones}\}$
- $Y = \{0^K \langle K \rangle : K \text{ is a positive integer}\}$

Out of those three languages, how many are decidable?

A: Zero

B: One

C: Two

D: Three

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Is **every** language decidable?

Undecidability

Theorem: There exists an **undecidable** language.

- To prove this theorem, we need to rule out all possible Turing machines!
- How can we possibly do this?

The liar paradox

Are you selecting option B as your answer to this question?

A: Yes B: No

C: Yes D: Yes

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Code as data

- Plan: We will construct a language Y such that trying to decide Y creates a liar paradox
- Key idea: A Turing machine M can be encoded as a binary string $\langle M \rangle$
 - “Code as data”
 - We’ll discuss this in more detail later

Turing machines analyzing Turing machines

- After encoding a Turing machine M as a binary string $\langle M \rangle$...
- We can use $\langle M \rangle$ as the **input for another Turing machine!**
- Compilers, syntax highlighting, linters...

Self-rejecting Turing machines

- Let M be a TM
- A strange-but-legal thing we can do: Run M on $\langle M \rangle$
- Three possibilities:
 - M accepts $\langle M \rangle$
 - M rejects $\langle M \rangle$
 - M loops on $\langle M \rangle$
- **Definition:** We say that a Turing machine M is self-rejecting if M rejects $\langle M \rangle$



Self-rejecting Turing machines

- Let **SELF-REJECTORS** = $\{\langle M \rangle : M \text{ is a self-rejecting Turing machine}\}$

Theorem: SELF-REJECTORS is **undecidable**

Proof: Let M be any TM. We'll show that M does not decide SELF-REJECTORS

- If M **rejects** $\langle M \rangle$, then $\langle M \rangle \in \text{SELF-REJECTORS}$, so M ought to **accept** $\langle M \rangle$ ✖
- If M **doesn't reject** $\langle M \rangle$, then $\langle M \rangle \notin \text{SELF-REJECTORS}$, so M ought to **reject** $\langle M \rangle$ ✖
- In either case, M does the wrong thing!

Interpreting the theorem

- We proved that there does not exist a **Turing machine** that decides SELF-REJECTORS
- **OBJECTION:** “Yeah, but I don’t particularly care about Turing machines. Is there some **other type of algorithm** that decides SELF-REJECTORS?”
- **RESPONSE:** The Church-Turing Thesis

The Church-Turing Thesis

- Let $Y \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$

Church-Turing Thesis:

There exists an “algorithm” / “procedure” for figuring out whether a given string is in Y **if and only if** there exists a Turing machine that decides Y .

← Intuitive notion

← Mathematically precise notion

The Church-Turing Thesis

- The Church-Turing thesis says that the Turing machine model is a “correct” way of modeling arbitrary computation
- The thesis says that the informal concept of an “algorithm” is successfully captured by the rigorous definition of a Turing machine
- Consequence: It is really, truly impossible to design an algorithm that decides SELF-REJECTORS or any other undecidable language!

The Church-Turing Thesis

- Let $Y \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$


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Are Turing machines too powerful?



- **OBJECTION:** “The Turing machine’s **infinite tape** is unrealistic!”
- **RESPONSE 1:** If M decides some language, then on any **particular** input w , the machine M only uses a **finite** amount of space
- **RESPONSE 2:** We are studying **idealized** computation
- **RESPONSE 3:** We’re especially focused on **impossibility** results, so it’s better to err on the side of making the model extra powerful

Are Turing machines powerful enough?



- **OBJECTION:** “To encompass all possible algorithms, we should add various **bells and whistles** to the Turing machine model.”
- Example: **Left-Right-Stationary Turing Machine:** Like an ordinary Turing machine, except it has a transition function $\delta: Q \times \Sigma \rightarrow Q \times \Sigma \times \{L, R, S\}$
- S means the head **does not move** in this step
- (Exercise: Rigorously define NEXT, accepting, rejecting, etc.)

Left-right-stationary Turing machines



- The left-right-stationary Turing machine model is **still realistic**, even though we added an extra feature
- Is it a counterexample to the Church-Turing thesis?
- No!
- Let's prove that the left-right-stationary Turing machine model is **equivalent** to the original Turing machine model

Left-right-stationary Turing machines




- Let Y be a language

Theorem: There exists a left-right-stationary TM that decides Y
if and only if there exists a TM that decides Y

- **Proof:** (3 slides) The “ \Leftarrow ” direction is trivial

Left-right-stationary Turing machines



- Idea of the proof of “ \Rightarrow ” direction: Simulate S by doing L followed by R
- Details: Let $M = (Q, q_0, q_{\text{accept}}, q_{\text{reject}}, \Sigma, \sqcup, \delta)$ be a left-right-stationary TM that decides Y
- New TM: $M' = (Q', q_0, q_{\text{accept}}, q_{\text{reject}}, \Sigma, \sqcup, \delta')$
- New set of states: $Q' = Q \cup \{\underline{q} : q \in Q\}$, i.e., two disjoint copies of Q

Left-right-stationary Turing machines



- New transition function $\delta': Q' \times \Sigma \rightarrow Q' \times \Sigma \times \{L, R\}$ given by:
 - If $\delta(q, b) = (q', b', L)$, then $\delta'(q, b) = \delta(q, b)$
 - If $\delta(q, b) = (q', b', R)$, then $\delta'(q, b) = \delta(q, b)$
 - If $\delta(q, b) = (q', b', S)$, then $\delta'(q, b) = (\underline{q}', b', L)$
 - For every q and b , we let $\delta'(\underline{q}, b) = (q, b, R)$
- Exercise: Rigorously prove that M' decides Y

The Church-Turing Thesis

- Let $Y \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$

Church-Turing Thesis:

There exists an “algorithm” / “procedure” for figuring out whether a given string is in Y **if and only if** there exists a Turing machine that decides Y .

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